Reference by the Lord Advocate of devolution issues under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act 1998 UKSC 31

Justices

Lord Reed (President), Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Sales, Lord Stephens and Lady Rose

Background to the Appeal

The Scottish Government has drafted a Scottish Independence Referendum Bill which makes provision for a referendum on the question, “Should Scotland be an independent country?”. Under the Scotland Act 1998 (“the Scotland Act”), the power of the Scottish Parliament to make legislation (or its “legislative competence”) is limited. A provision of a Bill will be outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and therefore not law if it relates to the matters which have been reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament in Westminster (sections 29(1) and (2)(b)). These reserved matters include “the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England” and “the Parliament of the United Kingdom” (Schedule 5, paragraphs 1(b) and (c)).

In this reference, the Lord Advocate (the senior law officer of the Scottish Government) asks the Court whether the provision of the proposed Bill which provides for a referendum on Scottish independence would be outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament because it relates to either or both of the reserved matters of the Union or the United Kingdom Parliament. This is a legal question about the Scottish Parliament’s power to make legislation under the Scotland Act. The Court is not being and could not be asked to give a view on the distinct political question of whether Scotland should become independent from the rest of the United Kingdom.

The powers of the Scottish Parliament were not in issue during the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. This is because, in 2013, an Order in Council under section 30(2) of the Scotland Act modified the definition of reserved matters to enable the Scottish Parliament to pass the 2014 referendum legislation. The United Kingdom Government is currently unwilling to agree to the making of another Order in Council to facilitate another referendum on Scottish independence.

The Lord Advocate’s reference was made under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act. The Advocate General for Scotland (the Scottish law officer of the United Kingdom Government) raises two preliminary issues, namely, whether the Court can and should answer the reference. There are consequently three questions which the Court must consider. First, is the question referred by the Lord Advocate a “devolution issue”? If not, it cannot be the subject of a reference under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6, which would mean that the Court does not have jurisdiction to decide it. Secondly, even if it is a devolution issue, should the Court exercise its discretion to decline to accept the reference? Thirdly, if the Court accepts the reference, how should it answer the question the Lord Advocate has referred to it?

Judgment

In a unanimous judgment, the Court answers the questions before it as follows. First, the question referred by the Advocate General is a devolution issue, which means that that the Court has jurisdiction to decide it. Secondly, the Court should accept the reference. Thirdly, the provision of the proposed Bill which makes provision for a referendum on the question, “Should Scotland be an independent country?” does relate to matters which have been reserved to the Parliament of the United Kingdom under the Scotland Act. In particular, it relates to the reserved matters of the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England and the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, in the absence of any modification of the definition of reserved matters (by an Order in Council or otherwise), the Scottish Parliament does not have the power to legislate for a referendum on Scottish independence.

Reasons for the Judgment

Issue 1: Is the question referred by the Lord Advocate a devolution issue?

Only a “devolution issue” can be referred to the Court under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act. The term “devolution issue” is defined by paragraph 1 of Schedule 6. Under paragraph 1(f), it includes “any other question arising by virtue of this Act about reserved matters” [13-14]. The Court concludes that the question referred by the Lord Advocate falls within this description and is therefore a devolution issue which the Court has jurisdiction to decide [47].

In reaching this conclusion, the Court holds, first, that the question referred is one “arising by virtue of” the Scotland Act because it is a question which arises under section 31(1) for the person wishing to introduce the Bill into the Scottish Parliament [16]. That person is required, on or before the Bill’s introduction, to give a statement confirming that, in their view, the provisions of the Bill would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament [9]. Secondly, the existence of the separate scheme for the scrutiny of Bills for legislative competence by the Court in section 33 of the Scotland Act does not prevent a reference from being made under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6 in relation to a proposed Bill, before it is introduced [21-27]. Thirdly, the terms of paragraph 1(f) of Schedule 6 are very wide. They are intended to sweep up any questions arising under the Scotland Act about reserved matters which are not covered elsewhere [37-42]. Fourthly, it is consistent with the rule of law and with the intention of the Scotland Act that the Lord Advocate should be able to obtain an authoritative judicial decision on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament in advance of the introduction of a Bill [44-46].

Issue 2: Should the Court decline to accept the Lord Advocate’s reference?

The Court concludes that it should accept the reference [54]. The reference has been made in order to obtain an authoritative ruling on a question of law which has already arisen as a matter of public importance. The Court’s answer will determine whether the proposed Bill is introduced into the Scottish Parliament. The reference is not therefore hypothetical, academic or premature [53].

Issue 3: Does the proposed Bill relate to reserved matters?

The question whether the provision of the proposed Bill which provides for a referendum on Scottish independence would relate to matters which have been reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament under the Scotland Act (section 29(2)(b)) is to be determined by reference to the purpose of the provision, having regard (among other things) to its effect in all the circumstances (section 29(3)) [56-57], [70], [75].

A provision will relate to a reserved matter if it has something more than a loose or consequential connection with it [57], [71-72]. The purpose and effect of the provision may be derived from a consideration of both the purpose of those introducing the legislation and the objective effect of its terms [73]. Its effect is not restricted to its legal consequences [74].

Applying this test, the reserved matters which are relevant here are “the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England” and “the Parliament of the United Kingdom” (Schedule 5, paragraphs 1(b) and (c)). The latter reservation includes the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament [76]. The purpose of the proposed Bill is to hold a lawful referendum on the question of whether Scotland should become an independent country, that is, on ending the Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament over Scotland [77], [82]. The Bill’s effect will not be confined to the holding of the referendum. Even if the referendum has no immediate legal consequences, it would be a political event with important political consequences [78-81]. It is therefore clear that the proposed Bill has more than a loose or consequential connection with the reserved matters of the Union of Scotland and England and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. Accordingly, the proposed Bill relates to reserved matters and is outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament [82-83], [92].

The Scottish National Party (intervening) made further written submissions founded on the right to self–determination in international law and the principle of legality in domestic law [84]. The Court rejects these submissions, holding that the right to self–determination is not in issue here [88-89] and does not require a narrow reading of “relates to” in section 29(2)(b) so as to limit the scope of the matters reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament under the Scotland Act [90]. Similarly, the allocation of powers between the United Kingdom and Scotland under the Scotland Act does not infringe the principle of legality [91].

References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment

Full judgment here.

Paul Reid, junior counsel to the Lord Advocate, instructed by the SGLD

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Craig (Appellant) v Her Majesty’s Advocate (for the Government of the United States of America) and another (Respondents) (Scotland) [2022] UKSC 6

The UK Supreme Court has unanimously allowed the appeal of James Craig, a British citizen living in Scotland. In May 2017, the US Government made a request for his extradition to the US, where he is accused of committing an offence relating to securities fraud.

The process for determining whether a person should be extradited from the UK is governed by the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act“). By the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (“the 2013 Act“), Parliament inserted into the 2003 Act a number of provisions referred to as “the forum bar provisions”. These provisions aim to prevent extradition where the offences could be fairly and effectively tried in the UK, and it is not in the interests of justice that the requested person should be extradited. Section 61 of the 2013 Act provides that the forum bar provisions will “come into force on such a day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint”. The Secretary of State brought the forum bar provisions into force in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in October 2013, but he did not bring them into force in Scotland.

Mr Craig wanted to rely on the forum bar provisions in the extradition proceedings brought against him in Scotland. He therefore issued a claim against the Advocate General for Scotland and the Scottish Ministers, arguing that the Secretary of State’s failure to bring the forum bar provisions into force in Scotland was unlawful. In December 2018, the Outer House of the Court of Session found in Mr Craig’s favour and made an order in which it “declared… that in its continuing failure to bring into force in Scotland the extradition forum bar provisions… the UK Government is acting unlawfully and contrary to its duties under section 61 of [the 2013 Act]”.

Notwithstanding that order, the UK Government failed to bring the forum bar provisions into force in Scotland until September 2021. In the meantime, the Lord Advocate continued to pursue extradition proceedings against Mr Craig. In July 2019, a sheriff decided that there was no bar to Mr Craig’s extradition under the 2003 Act and that his extradition would be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention“). The sheriff sent the matter on to the Scottish Ministers, who in September 2019 decided that Mr Craig should be extradited to the US.

Mr Craig appealed, unsuccessfully, to the High Court of Justiciary. He appealed to the UK Supreme Court.

Lord Reed’s sole judgment, with which the other Justices agree, said:

Section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that a “member of the Scottish Government has no power to… act, so far as the… act is incompatible with any of the Convention rights” [25]. This means that the Lord Advocate has no power to conduct extradition proceedings against Mr Craig, and the Scottish Ministers have no power to order his extradition, if those acts are incompatible with Mr Craig’s rights under the Convention [37], [47].

There is no dispute that the extradition of Mr Craig would interfere with his right to respect for his private and family life, as guaranteed by article 8(1) of the Convention. Such an interference could, however, be justified under article 8(2), if it is “in accordance with the law”, if it pursues a “legitimate aim”, and if it is “necessary in a democratic society”. To satisfy the first of those three requirements, the interference must be in conformity with domestic law and the domestic law must meet the requirements of the rule of law, so as to afford adequate legal protection against arbitrariness. This is an absolute requirement. The executive is afforded no margin of discretion in meeting it [48]-[50].

The interference with Mr Craig’s rights under article 8(1) was not “in accordance with the law”, within the meaning of article 8(2) [52]. The order made by the Outer House in December 2018 was expressed in the present tense, making clear that the Secretary of State was “continuing” to act in breach of section 61 of the 2013 Act by failing to bring the forum bar provisions into force. The Secretary of State had a duty to act in conformity with that order, and his failure to do so was unlawful [41]-[42]. The extradition procedure followed in Mr Craig’s case did not therefore accord with section 61 of the 2013 Act [52].

It is no answer to this that the order made by the Outer House was merely declaratory, rather than coercive [43]. It is firmly established that there is a clear expectation that the Government will comply with declaratory orders, and it is in reliance on that expectation that the courts usually refrain from making coercive orders against the Government and grant declaratory orders instead [44]. This is one of the core principles of our constitution. It is vital to the mutual trust which underpins the relationship between the Government and the courts [46].

Accordingly, the extradition proceedings against Mr Craig were not conducted “in accordance with the law” and so were incompatible with his rights under article 8 of the Convention. It follows that the extradition order made against him is invalid [53].

References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment

A new extradition hearing may be held before a different sheriff, at which Mr Craig will be able to rely on the forum bar provisions (in addition to any other arguments properly available to him).

Ampersand’s Aidan O’Neill QC, leading Fred Mackintosh QC, instructed by Dunne Defence, represented the appellant.

The judgment of the UK can be found here.

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UK Supreme Court allows appeal in James Craig US Extradition case

Mr Craig appealed, unsuccessfully, to the High Court of Justiciary. He appealed to the UK Supreme Court.

Lord Reed’s sole judgment, with which the other Justices agree, said:

References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment

A new extradition hearing may be held before a different sheriff, at which Mr Craig will be able to rely on the forum bar provisions (in addition to any other arguments properly available to him).

Ampersand’s Aidan O’Neill QC, leading Fred Mackintosh QC, instructed by Dunne Defence, represented the appellant.

The judgment of the UK can be found here.

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Ampersand Advocates welcomes Ian Forrester QC back to practice

Ampersand Advocates is delighted to welcome back to practice Ian Forrester QC.

Mr Forrester is a renowned lawyer in European and Competition law and returns to practice following his appointment as the UK nominated Judge to the General Court of the European Union ending due to Brexit. He brings an unrivalled wealth of knowledge and experience for any instructions, and expects to concentrate on advisory and Arbitration work, including appointment as an Arbitrator.

On his return to Practice, Mr Forrester said: “It is fun to return to practice. When in Luxembourg, I discovered that my colleagues were well acquainted with the special status and history of Scots law. They were supportive and generous during the turbulent steps leading to Brexit, a political act which leaves unsettled dozens of important legal questions of great significance for many people in different walks of life. I look forward to re-entering the community of senior practitioners, assisted by my judicial experience.”

Stable Director Euan Mackenzie added: “Ian has had an illustrious career, including having spent five years as a Judge of the European Court of Justice. We are delighted to welcome a lawyer of Ian’s standing back to legal practice and have no doubt that his expertise in all matters relating to European law will be in high demand as the UK forges a new relationship with the EU.”

You can view more details of Mr Forrester’s practice here: https://ampersandadvocates.com/people/ian-forrester/

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Ian S. Forrester KC LLD

Ian Forrester KC is a renowned practitioner in the field of European law, specialising in competition, intellectual property, customs, antidumping, pharmaceutical regulation, football, the precautionary principle, broadcasting, computer software and due process. He was educated and trained in Scotland, Louisiana, New York and Brussels and has been a member of the bars of Scotland, New York, England and Brussels.

Mr Forrester returned to practice at the Scots Bar in 2021. From 2015 until 2020 he was the judge from the UK on the General Court of the European Union hearing about 200 cases concerning competition, access to documents, trademarks, plant varieties, public procurement, employment, and other European Union questions. His mandate came to an end with Brexit.

He has been an arbitrator, counsel, and expert Arbitral proceedings under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce, International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Court of Arbitration for Sport and has argued cases before courts in Scotland, England, Belgium, Serbia and France, as well as the EFTA court, the ECtHR in Strasbourg, and the EU courts in Luxembourg. He has acted for a number of important entities, including BBC, Canon, DuPont, European Commission, Fujitsu, Intel, Liberal Democrat Party, Microsoft, Scottish Football Association, Toyota, UEFA, as well as a number of indigent prisoners.

He has extensive experience in arbitration or mediation matters, either as advocate for a party, or as expert witness on European law, or as arbitrator/ mediator, from 1983 to 2014, and since his departure from the General Court of the European Union in 2021. The arbitrations have mostly been conducted under the auspices of the ICC in Paris, or the CAS in Lausanne; and once before the ICSID in Washington. The ICC cases involved disputes about investment contracts, trade secrets, hotel construction, stolen technology, and a variety of other commercial conflicts. The CAS matters involved player transfers, treatment of injured players, broadcasting rights and the conduct of elections to governing bodies.

His leading competition cases include Magill (compulsory copyright licensing); Bosman (football transfers); Microsoft (computer servers); IMS (compulsory licensing); GlaxoSmithKline (parallel trade in pharmaceuticals); Les Laboratoires Servier (settlement of patent disputes); Chalkor/Halcor (due process and judicial review).

European Court of Human Rights cases concerned forcing a citizen to speak on pain of punishment even if the answer itself reveals punishable conduct (Al Fayed and Harrods: Fayed v The United Kingdom); press sources (Hans Martin Tillack v Belgium); prisoner’s rights (Kalashnikov v Russia); fair trial and right to property (Karic and Djordjevic v Serbia). He helped to achieve the liberation of Louis Henry Burns, an indigent prisoner, on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal from a conviction based upon a coerced confession.

During his practice he has been a consistently top ranked counsel by the leading Legal Directories in the UK and European editions of the guides. In the 2023 Chambers and Partners UK Bar Guide he is Band 1 ranked in Public Law matters. Chambers say: “Ian Forrester KC’s return to private practice is a highly significant development for the Scottish Bar. Until 2020 he sat for the UK on the bench of the General Court of the European Union. To the Faculty of Advocates he brings immense experience of legal practice in a host of areas including competition and international trade law.”

Further detail about his practice, visit: ianstewartforrester.com.

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Michael Way

Michael Way’s principle areas of practice are public & administrative law, commercial disputes and civil liberties/human rights.

Michael is listed as a ‘Rising Star’ in the 2021/22 Legal 500 in both Commercial Disputes and Administrative and Public Law.

“A brilliant advocate – insightful, thorough and refreshingly convincing on his feet, he is approachable and easy to work with.” – Legal 500 2021/22 ‘Administrative and Public Law’

After spending several years as a performer in the music industry, Michael trained with one of Scotland’s leading commercial law firms and undertook a six month secondment to the Scottish Government Legal Directorate. Shortly after qualifying as a solicitor Michael began devilling, during which he won the Mike Jones Excellence in Advocacy prize and was the Faculty Scholar 2018/19.

Since calling, Michael has appeared regularly in courts and tribunals throughout Scotland. In particular, he has:

appeared for Serco defending over 150 interdict actions, including appearances in the Sheriff Appeal Court and instruction during the related Inner House reclaiming motion process;
been instructed by petitioners in a number of successful Court of Session judicial review actions in immigration and housing matters;
instructed by child respondents in nobile officium petitions seeking recognition of English High Court deprivation of liberty orders;
appeared frequently for the Advocate General as a standing ‘junior junior’ in the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber);
been instructed in a variety of property, contractual, professional negligence, debt recovery and insolvency disputes, including success after proof in a case involving a challenge to interest to enforce real burdens;
developed a proficiency in consumer rights issues, including claims under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Consumer Protection From Unfair Trading Regulations 2008;
assisted in a major offshore dispute in Jersey;
undertaken criminal appeal work, with successful appearances in the High Court and Sheriff Appeal Court.

Michael has a strong academic background with degrees from Oxford, King’s College London and Edinburgh. Since 2015, Michael has tutored at the University of Edinburgh (Jurisprudence; Critical Legal Thinking) and was previously a guest lecturer in Business Law at Queen Margaret University. He was the research assistant to Lady Poole and Sheriffs McCartney and Drummond on their recent book A Practical Guide to Public Law Litigation in Scotland (2019; W.Green)

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