Ampersand welcome Brandon Malone
Ampersand is delighted to welcome Brandon Malone to the stable, following his calling to the Bar today.
On Brandon’s arrival, Stable Director Euan Mackenzie KC, said: “I am delighted to welcome Brandon to Ampersand. He is a renowned lawyer with an impressive CV and accomplishments before coming to the Bar. He will be an asset to the Stable. I wish him all the best in his career as an Advocate”. Ampersand’s Practice Manager, Alan Moffat added “I am delighted to welcome our newest member of Ampersand. Brandon’s arrival brings the membership to 61 and the experience which he brings is a fantastic fit for Ampersand’s core areas of practice, including our increasing range of ADR offering. He will be a real asset to those looking to instruct counsel. I am sure that joining Ampersand will offer rewarding opportunities and collaborative support”.
Brandon calls to the Bar following thirty years’ experience as a commercial litigation solicitor, twenty of those years as a solicitor advocate.
Brandon is also Barrister authorised to practice in England and Wales, and has rights of audience before the DIFC Court, Dubai, UAE.
As a solicitor, Brandon specialised in construction and engineering law and international arbitration. He is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, and an eminent Fellow of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. He has wide ranging experience of construction, engineering, infrastructure and energy disputes.
Brandon has a particular interest in alternative dispute resolution. He regularly sits as an arbitrator in domestic, UK and international cases, and is recommended as a global leader in arbitration by Who’s Who Legal. He also sits as an adjudicator and expert determiner. He is a FIDIC Certified Adjudicator (dispute board member) and a mediator registered with RICS, IMI and CMC.
Brandon also has significant experience of energy and technology disputes, and has dealt with a number of blockchain and cryptocurrency cases. He Chairs the ICCA – New York City Bar – CPR Institute Working Group on Cybersecurity in International Arbitration.
For further information about Brandon’s practice view his profile here:
To instruct Brandon, please contact our Ampersand Clerking Team: ampersandclerks@advocates.org.uk.
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Brandon Malone
Brandon Malone called to the Bar in 2022 following thirty years’ experience as a commercial litigation solicitor, twenty of those years as a solicitor advocate.
Brandon is also Barrister authorised to practice in England and Wales, and has rights of audience before the DIFC Court, Dubai, UAE.
As a solicitor, Brandon specialised in construction and engineering law and international arbitration. He is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, and an eminent Fellow of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. He has wide ranging experience of construction, engineering, infrastructure and energy disputes.
Brandon has a particular interest in alternative dispute resolution. He regularly sits as an arbitrator in domestic, UK and international cases, and is recommended as a global leader in arbitration by Who’s Who Legal. He also sits as an adjudicator and expert determiner. He is a FIDIC Certified Adjudicator (dispute board member) and a mediator registered with RICS, IMI and CMC.
He has appeared in numerous substantive hearings in the Sheriff Court, the Outer and Inner House, and before a variety of tribunals.
Brandon also has significant experience of energy and technology disputes, and has dealt with a number of blockchain and cryptocurrency cases. He Chairs the ICCA – New York City Bar – CPR Institute Working Group on Cybersecurity in International Arbitration.
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Reference by the Lord Advocate of devolution issues under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act 1998 UKSC 31
Justices
Lord Reed (President), Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Sales, Lord Stephens and Lady Rose
Background to the Appeal
The Scottish Government has drafted a Scottish Independence Referendum Bill which makes provision for a referendum on the question, “Should Scotland be an independent country?”. Under the Scotland Act 1998 (“the Scotland Act”), the power of the Scottish Parliament to make legislation (or its “legislative competence”) is limited. A provision of a Bill will be outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and therefore not law if it relates to the matters which have been reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament in Westminster (sections 29(1) and (2)(b)). These reserved matters include “the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England” and “the Parliament of the United Kingdom” (Schedule 5, paragraphs 1(b) and (c)).
In this reference, the Lord Advocate (the senior law officer of the Scottish Government) asks the Court whether the provision of the proposed Bill which provides for a referendum on Scottish independence would be outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament because it relates to either or both of the reserved matters of the Union or the United Kingdom Parliament. This is a legal question about the Scottish Parliament’s power to make legislation under the Scotland Act. The Court is not being and could not be asked to give a view on the distinct political question of whether Scotland should become independent from the rest of the United Kingdom.
The powers of the Scottish Parliament were not in issue during the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. This is because, in 2013, an Order in Council under section 30(2) of the Scotland Act modified the definition of reserved matters to enable the Scottish Parliament to pass the 2014 referendum legislation. The United Kingdom Government is currently unwilling to agree to the making of another Order in Council to facilitate another referendum on Scottish independence.
The Lord Advocate’s reference was made under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act. The Advocate General for Scotland (the Scottish law officer of the United Kingdom Government) raises two preliminary issues, namely, whether the Court can and should answer the reference. There are consequently three questions which the Court must consider. First, is the question referred by the Lord Advocate a “devolution issue”? If not, it cannot be the subject of a reference under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6, which would mean that the Court does not have jurisdiction to decide it. Secondly, even if it is a devolution issue, should the Court exercise its discretion to decline to accept the reference? Thirdly, if the Court accepts the reference, how should it answer the question the Lord Advocate has referred to it?
Judgment
In a unanimous judgment, the Court answers the questions before it as follows. First, the question referred by the Advocate General is a devolution issue, which means that that the Court has jurisdiction to decide it. Secondly, the Court should accept the reference. Thirdly, the provision of the proposed Bill which makes provision for a referendum on the question, “Should Scotland be an independent country?” does relate to matters which have been reserved to the Parliament of the United Kingdom under the Scotland Act. In particular, it relates to the reserved matters of the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England and the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, in the absence of any modification of the definition of reserved matters (by an Order in Council or otherwise), the Scottish Parliament does not have the power to legislate for a referendum on Scottish independence.
Reasons for the Judgment
Issue 1: Is the question referred by the Lord Advocate a devolution issue?
Only a “devolution issue” can be referred to the Court under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act. The term “devolution issue” is defined by paragraph 1 of Schedule 6. Under paragraph 1(f), it includes “any other question arising by virtue of this Act about reserved matters” [13-14]. The Court concludes that the question referred by the Lord Advocate falls within this description and is therefore a devolution issue which the Court has jurisdiction to decide [47].
In reaching this conclusion, the Court holds, first, that the question referred is one “arising by virtue of” the Scotland Act because it is a question which arises under section 31(1) for the person wishing to introduce the Bill into the Scottish Parliament [16]. That person is required, on or before the Bill’s introduction, to give a statement confirming that, in their view, the provisions of the Bill would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament [9]. Secondly, the existence of the separate scheme for the scrutiny of Bills for legislative competence by the Court in section 33 of the Scotland Act does not prevent a reference from being made under paragraph 34 of Schedule 6 in relation to a proposed Bill, before it is introduced [21-27]. Thirdly, the terms of paragraph 1(f) of Schedule 6 are very wide. They are intended to sweep up any questions arising under the Scotland Act about reserved matters which are not covered elsewhere [37-42]. Fourthly, it is consistent with the rule of law and with the intention of the Scotland Act that the Lord Advocate should be able to obtain an authoritative judicial decision on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament in advance of the introduction of a Bill [44-46].
Issue 2: Should the Court decline to accept the Lord Advocate’s reference?
The Court concludes that it should accept the reference [54]. The reference has been made in order to obtain an authoritative ruling on a question of law which has already arisen as a matter of public importance. The Court’s answer will determine whether the proposed Bill is introduced into the Scottish Parliament. The reference is not therefore hypothetical, academic or premature [53].
Issue 3: Does the proposed Bill relate to reserved matters?
The question whether the provision of the proposed Bill which provides for a referendum on Scottish independence would relate to matters which have been reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament under the Scotland Act (section 29(2)(b)) is to be determined by reference to the purpose of the provision, having regard (among other things) to its effect in all the circumstances (section 29(3)) [56-57], [70], [75].
A provision will relate to a reserved matter if it has something more than a loose or consequential connection with it [57], [71-72]. The purpose and effect of the provision may be derived from a consideration of both the purpose of those introducing the legislation and the objective effect of its terms [73]. Its effect is not restricted to its legal consequences [74].
Applying this test, the reserved matters which are relevant here are “the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England” and “the Parliament of the United Kingdom” (Schedule 5, paragraphs 1(b) and (c)). The latter reservation includes the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament [76]. The purpose of the proposed Bill is to hold a lawful referendum on the question of whether Scotland should become an independent country, that is, on ending the Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament over Scotland [77], [82]. The Bill’s effect will not be confined to the holding of the referendum. Even if the referendum has no immediate legal consequences, it would be a political event with important political consequences [78-81]. It is therefore clear that the proposed Bill has more than a loose or consequential connection with the reserved matters of the Union of Scotland and England and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. Accordingly, the proposed Bill relates to reserved matters and is outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament [82-83], [92].
The Scottish National Party (intervening) made further written submissions founded on the right to self–determination in international law and the principle of legality in domestic law [84]. The Court rejects these submissions, holding that the right to self–determination is not in issue here [88-89] and does not require a narrow reading of “relates to” in section 29(2)(b) so as to limit the scope of the matters reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament under the Scotland Act [90]. Similarly, the allocation of powers between the United Kingdom and Scotland under the Scotland Act does not infringe the principle of legality [91].
References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment
Full judgment here.
Paul Reid, junior counsel to the Lord Advocate, instructed by the SGLD
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Craig (Appellant) v Her Majesty’s Advocate (for the Government of the United States of America) and another (Respondents) (Scotland) [2022] UKSC 6
The UK Supreme Court has unanimously allowed the appeal of James Craig, a British citizen living in Scotland. In May 2017, the US Government made a request for his extradition to the US, where he is accused of committing an offence relating to securities fraud.
The process for determining whether a person should be extradited from the UK is governed by the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act“). By the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (“the 2013 Act“), Parliament inserted into the 2003 Act a number of provisions referred to as “the forum bar provisions”. These provisions aim to prevent extradition where the offences could be fairly and effectively tried in the UK, and it is not in the interests of justice that the requested person should be extradited. Section 61 of the 2013 Act provides that the forum bar provisions will “come into force on such a day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint”. The Secretary of State brought the forum bar provisions into force in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in October 2013, but he did not bring them into force in Scotland.
Mr Craig wanted to rely on the forum bar provisions in the extradition proceedings brought against him in Scotland. He therefore issued a claim against the Advocate General for Scotland and the Scottish Ministers, arguing that the Secretary of State’s failure to bring the forum bar provisions into force in Scotland was unlawful. In December 2018, the Outer House of the Court of Session found in Mr Craig’s favour and made an order in which it “declared… that in its continuing failure to bring into force in Scotland the extradition forum bar provisions… the UK Government is acting unlawfully and contrary to its duties under section 61 of [the 2013 Act]”.
Notwithstanding that order, the UK Government failed to bring the forum bar provisions into force in Scotland until September 2021. In the meantime, the Lord Advocate continued to pursue extradition proceedings against Mr Craig. In July 2019, a sheriff decided that there was no bar to Mr Craig’s extradition under the 2003 Act and that his extradition would be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention“). The sheriff sent the matter on to the Scottish Ministers, who in September 2019 decided that Mr Craig should be extradited to the US.
Mr Craig appealed, unsuccessfully, to the High Court of Justiciary. He appealed to the UK Supreme Court.
Lord Reed’s sole judgment, with which the other Justices agree, said:
Section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that a “member of the Scottish Government has no power to… act, so far as the… act is incompatible with any of the Convention rights” [25]. This means that the Lord Advocate has no power to conduct extradition proceedings against Mr Craig, and the Scottish Ministers have no power to order his extradition, if those acts are incompatible with Mr Craig’s rights under the Convention [37], [47].
There is no dispute that the extradition of Mr Craig would interfere with his right to respect for his private and family life, as guaranteed by article 8(1) of the Convention. Such an interference could, however, be justified under article 8(2), if it is “in accordance with the law”, if it pursues a “legitimate aim”, and if it is “necessary in a democratic society”. To satisfy the first of those three requirements, the interference must be in conformity with domestic law and the domestic law must meet the requirements of the rule of law, so as to afford adequate legal protection against arbitrariness. This is an absolute requirement. The executive is afforded no margin of discretion in meeting it [48]-[50].
The interference with Mr Craig’s rights under article 8(1) was not “in accordance with the law”, within the meaning of article 8(2) [52]. The order made by the Outer House in December 2018 was expressed in the present tense, making clear that the Secretary of State was “continuing” to act in breach of section 61 of the 2013 Act by failing to bring the forum bar provisions into force. The Secretary of State had a duty to act in conformity with that order, and his failure to do so was unlawful [41]-[42]. The extradition procedure followed in Mr Craig’s case did not therefore accord with section 61 of the 2013 Act [52].
It is no answer to this that the order made by the Outer House was merely declaratory, rather than coercive [43]. It is firmly established that there is a clear expectation that the Government will comply with declaratory orders, and it is in reliance on that expectation that the courts usually refrain from making coercive orders against the Government and grant declaratory orders instead [44]. This is one of the core principles of our constitution. It is vital to the mutual trust which underpins the relationship between the Government and the courts [46].
Accordingly, the extradition proceedings against Mr Craig were not conducted “in accordance with the law” and so were incompatible with his rights under article 8 of the Convention. It follows that the extradition order made against him is invalid [53].
References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment
A new extradition hearing may be held before a different sheriff, at which Mr Craig will be able to rely on the forum bar provisions (in addition to any other arguments properly available to him).
Ampersand’s Aidan O’Neill QC, leading Fred Mackintosh QC, instructed by Dunne Defence, represented the appellant.
The judgment of the UK can be found here.
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UK Supreme Court allows appeal in James Craig US Extradition case
The UK Supreme Court has unanimously allowed the appeal of James Craig, a British citizen living in Scotland. In May 2017, the US Government made a request for his extradition to the US, where he is accused of committing an offence relating to securities fraud.
The process for determining whether a person should be extradited from the UK is governed by the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act“). By the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (“the 2013 Act“), Parliament inserted into the 2003 Act a number of provisions referred to as “the forum bar provisions”. These provisions aim to prevent extradition where the offences could be fairly and effectively tried in the UK, and it is not in the interests of justice that the requested person should be extradited. Section 61 of the 2013 Act provides that the forum bar provisions will “come into force on such a day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint”. The Secretary of State brought the forum bar provisions into force in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in October 2013, but he did not bring them into force in Scotland.
Mr Craig wanted to rely on the forum bar provisions in the extradition proceedings brought against him in Scotland. He therefore issued a claim against the Advocate General for Scotland and the Scottish Ministers, arguing that the Secretary of State’s failure to bring the forum bar provisions into force in Scotland was unlawful. In December 2018, the Outer House of the Court of Session found in Mr Craig’s favour and made an order in which it “declared… that in its continuing failure to bring into force in Scotland the extradition forum bar provisions… the UK Government is acting unlawfully and contrary to its duties under section 61 of [the 2013 Act]”.
Notwithstanding that order, the UK Government failed to bring the forum bar provisions into force in Scotland until September 2021. In the meantime, the Lord Advocate continued to pursue extradition proceedings against Mr Craig. In July 2019, a sheriff decided that there was no bar to Mr Craig’s extradition under the 2003 Act and that his extradition would be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention“). The sheriff sent the matter on to the Scottish Ministers, who in September 2019 decided that Mr Craig should be extradited to the US.
Mr Craig appealed, unsuccessfully, to the High Court of Justiciary. He appealed to the UK Supreme Court.
Lord Reed’s sole judgment, with which the other Justices agree, said:
Section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that a “member of the Scottish Government has no power to… act, so far as the… act is incompatible with any of the Convention rights” [25]. This means that the Lord Advocate has no power to conduct extradition proceedings against Mr Craig, and the Scottish Ministers have no power to order his extradition, if those acts are incompatible with Mr Craig’s rights under the Convention [37], [47].
There is no dispute that the extradition of Mr Craig would interfere with his right to respect for his private and family life, as guaranteed by article 8(1) of the Convention. Such an interference could, however, be justified under article 8(2), if it is “in accordance with the law”, if it pursues a “legitimate aim”, and if it is “necessary in a democratic society”. To satisfy the first of those three requirements, the interference must be in conformity with domestic law and the domestic law must meet the requirements of the rule of law, so as to afford adequate legal protection against arbitrariness. This is an absolute requirement. The executive is afforded no margin of discretion in meeting it [48]-[50].
The interference with Mr Craig’s rights under article 8(1) was not “in accordance with the law”, within the meaning of article 8(2) [52]. The order made by the Outer House in December 2018 was expressed in the present tense, making clear that the Secretary of State was “continuing” to act in breach of section 61 of the 2013 Act by failing to bring the forum bar provisions into force. The Secretary of State had a duty to act in conformity with that order, and his failure to do so was unlawful [41]-[42]. The extradition procedure followed in Mr Craig’s case did not therefore accord with section 61 of the 2013 Act [52].
It is no answer to this that the order made by the Outer House was merely declaratory, rather than coercive [43]. It is firmly established that there is a clear expectation that the Government will comply with declaratory orders, and it is in reliance on that expectation that the courts usually refrain from making coercive orders against the Government and grant declaratory orders instead [44]. This is one of the core principles of our constitution. It is vital to the mutual trust which underpins the relationship between the Government and the courts [46].
Accordingly, the extradition proceedings against Mr Craig were not conducted “in accordance with the law” and so were incompatible with his rights under article 8 of the Convention. It follows that the extradition order made against him is invalid [53].
References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment
A new extradition hearing may be held before a different sheriff, at which Mr Craig will be able to rely on the forum bar provisions (in addition to any other arguments properly available to him).
Ampersand’s Aidan O’Neill QC, leading Fred Mackintosh QC, instructed by Dunne Defence, represented the appellant.
The judgment of the UK can be found here.
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Ampersand Advocates welcomes Ian Forrester QC back to practice
Ampersand Advocates is delighted to welcome back to practice Ian Forrester QC.
Mr Forrester is a renowned lawyer in European and Competition law and returns to practice following his appointment as the UK nominated Judge to the General Court of the European Union ending due to Brexit. He brings an unrivalled wealth of knowledge and experience for any instructions, and expects to concentrate on advisory and Arbitration work, including appointment as an Arbitrator.
On his return to Practice, Mr Forrester said: “It is fun to return to practice. When in Luxembourg, I discovered that my colleagues were well acquainted with the special status and history of Scots law. They were supportive and generous during the turbulent steps leading to Brexit, a political act which leaves unsettled dozens of important legal questions of great significance for many people in different walks of life. I look forward to re-entering the community of senior practitioners, assisted by my judicial experience.”
Stable Director Euan Mackenzie added: “Ian has had an illustrious career, including having spent five years as a Judge of the European Court of Justice. We are delighted to welcome a lawyer of Ian’s standing back to legal practice and have no doubt that his expertise in all matters relating to European law will be in high demand as the UK forges a new relationship with the EU.”
You can view more details of Mr Forrester’s practice here: https://ampersandadvocates.com/people/ian-forrester/
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